I just researched that also and it stated that Westmoreland ordered Operation Pegasus, a joint Army, Marine and ARVN ground advance that relieved the base and ended the siege by mid April after 77 days.
Abrams was de facto commander from 67. Westmoreland just couldn't cut it. He was put in, despite a mediocre Army career because the Democrats knew they could use him as a yes boy. The marines were relieved by a combined force consisting mainly of the 1st Air Cav. They opened the road so that you could escape... but, no gratitude from you .
He next served five years in Vietnam. In April 1967 Abrams, by then a four-star
general and vice chief of staff of the army, was named deputy to Gen.
William Westmoreland, head of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. On July 2, 1968, after Westmoreland was appointed army chief of staff, Abrams succeeded him as top commander of all U.S. forces in the Vietnam theatre. In this position he
implemented the Vietnamization policy of Pres.
Richard M. Nixon, overseeing a reduction of U.S. combat troops from more than 500,000 to fewer than 30,000 and also directing an intensive training program for the army of South Vietnam. To give time for Vietnamization to succeed, he was put in charge of the U.S.–South Vietnamese incursions into Cambodia and Laos in 1970–71. In 1972 he succeeded Westmoreland once again, becoming army chief of staff in Washington, D.C. In that role he wrestled with the mounting antimilitary backlash prevalent at the end of the Vietnam War and began to
implement the transition to an
all-volunteer force.
Westmoreland decision to invest Khe Sahn reminds me of the foolish French decision to invest Dien Bien Phu. Note the reference to the Marine General who thought the decision was stupid.
decision then had to be made by the American high command: either commit more of the limited manpower in I Corps to the defense of Khe Sanh or abandon the base.
[44][Note 3] Westmoreland regarded this choice as quite simple. In his memoirs, he listed the reasons for a continued effort
Khe Sanh could serve as a patrol base for blocking enemy infiltration from Laos along Route 9; as a base for SOG operations to harass the enemy in Laos; as an airstrip for reconnaissance planes surveying the Ho Chi Minh Trail; as the western anchor for defenses south of the DMZ; and as an eventual jump-off point for ground operations to cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail.
[45][Note 4]
Leading Marine officers, however, were not all of the same opinion. Cushman, the new III MAF commander, supported Westmoreland (perhaps wanting to mend Army/Marine relations after the departure of Walt).
[48] Other concerns raised included the assertion that the real danger to I Corps was from a direct threat to
Quảng Trị City and other urban areas; that a defense would be pointless as a threat to infiltration, since PAVN troops could easily bypass Khe Sanh; that the base was too isolated and that the Marines "had neither the helicopter resources, the troops, nor the logistical bases for such operations". Additionally, Shore argues that the "weather was another critical factor because the poor visibility and low overcasts attendant to the monsoon season made such operations hazardous."
[49] Brigadier General Lowell English (assistant commander
3rd Marine Division) complained that the defense of the isolated outpost was ludicrous. "When you're at Khe Sanh, you're not really anywhere. You could lose it and you really haven't lost a damn thing."
[50]
As far as Westmoreland was concerned, however, all he needed to know was that the PAVN had massed large numbers of troops for a set-piece battle. Making the prospect even more enticing was that the base was in an unpopulated area where American firepower could be fully employed without civilian casualties. The opportunity to engage and destroy a formerly elusive enemy that was moving toward a fixed position promised a victory of unprecedented proportions.
[50]